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A B S T R A C T 
Both Spinoza and Vasubandhu provide accounts of human nature in which the emergence of human potential in any person depends upon facilitating 
interaction with others in which the person's potential is likewise facilitated. Centredness of self relies on receptiveness and responsiveness to those with 
whom one interacts so that one's reality is centred in the interactive process. Feminist ethics, described by reference to Nel Noddings, is grounded in a 
similar kind of theory of human nature, one in which the principle of connectedness overrides the principle of competition. The dialectic between 
feminist theories of human nature and those of Spinoza and Vasubandhu provides a connection between an ethics of caring and an ethics of principle. 
R E S U M E 
Spinoza et Vasubandhu nous presentent tousdeux une conception de la nature humaine selon laquellel emergence du potentiel humain d u n individu 
resultede la facilitation de ses echangesavecd'autrespersonnesdont le potentiel est, lui aussi, developpe. Le moi veritable d u n individu est dependant 
de sa receptivite aux autres et de la facon dont il reagit envers autrui, de sorte que la realite d'un etre s'organise autour du processus d'interaction. 
L'ethique feministe, si Ton s'en refere a Nel Noddings, se base sur le meme genre de theorie de la nature humaine, d'apres laquelle le principe de la 
connexite est plus important que le principe de la rivalue. La dialectique entre les theories feministes de la nature humaine et celles de Spinoza et 
Vasubandhu fournit un lien entre une ethique qui a a coeur l'interet humain et une ethique de principe. 
T h e m a i n endeavor throughout the history of religious 
ph i losophy has been to understand what it means to be a 
h u m a n being i n the fullest sense. T h e process of becoming 
fu l ly h u m a n has been expressed often i n terms of the 
actualization of our true natures—the pr imary concern 
has been that of ethical development. In this paper I a i m to 
show that Spinoza, a seventeenth-century Dutch rational-
ist, and Vasubandhu, a fifth-century Indian yogacara 
Buddhist , are two valuable historical sources for feminist 
approaches to a redefinit ion of h u m a n nature and a more 
egalitarian ethical theory. 
Some feminists question the viabli ty of us ing historical 
phi losphers as resources for feminist research. There are 
two m a i n reasons for these skeptical attitudes: (1) phi los-
ophers have tradit ionally not addressed the historical con-
dit ions that have contributed to the subordination of 
w o m e n and (2) philosophers have tradit ionally empha-
sized male objective rationality at the expense of female 
subjective emotionality, thereby margina l iz ing women's 
interests and activities. 
M a n y great philosophers' works have been selectively 
analyzed and discussed to give the impression that they 
were only concerned w i t h topics w h i c h were of interest to 
the interpreters. For example, Spinoza's Ethics has been 
discussed largely i n terms of the logical problems w i t h i n 
his deductive system of thought. There has been m u c h less 
analysis of the Ethics i n terms of the relation between 
reason and emotion, a relation w h i c h is foundational to 
his account of h u m a n nature and his theory of ethics—the 
topic of the book. 1 
In defence of my use of historical philosophers i n the 
development of feminist thought, I wish to point out that 
an important contr ibut ion to be made by feminists is the 
reinterpretation of historical phi losophical approaches, 
where such reinterpretation is appropriate and helpful . 
T h e task for feminists, i n regard to historical phi los-
ophers, is to select, interpret, and communicate their 
ideas and theories w h i c h have previously been described 
through methods w h i c h have excluded their usefulness for 
women because they were considered irrelevant to the 
interpreters' interests. Feminist methodologies can be 
appl ied to historical philosophers i n order to use their 
considerable insights for the benefit of feminist efforts to 
formulate new theories of h u m a n nature. T o ignore 
important historical , holist ic ph i losophica l approaches is 
to impede the development of feminist theory. Feminist 
hermeneutics reveal new avenues for explorat ion i n his-
torical phi losophy. 
Spinoza and Vasubandhu d i d not examine historical, 
empir ica l realities and, therefore, their philosophies can-
not address the important topic of the historical subordi-
nat ion and marginal izat ion of women. T h e i r usefulness 
for feminists lies i n the connections they make between an 
ethics of compassion and a metaphysics of interrelatedness 
i n their theories of h u m a n nature. T h e i r theories of 
h u m a n nature revolve around the assumption that emo-
t ion and reason are inseparable. T h e combinat ion of 
being and k n o w i n g characterizes self-emergence in the 
dynamic process of interrelatedness described by Spinoza 
and Vasubandhu. 
T h e Spinoza-Vasubandhu conjunction is useful because 
the two philosophers ' accounts of self-determination shed 
l ight on each other. Spinoza and Vasubandhu are mutu-
al ly i n f o r m i n g on the topics of metaphysics and episte-
mology as wel l as i n regard to their theories of motivation, 
the self, and m o r a l i t y — a l l of w h i c h are central to an 
adequate account of h u m a n nature and ethical develop-
ment. More w i l l be said later i n this article to elaborate on 
the way i n w h i c h insights from one phi losopher contrib-
utes to an understanding of the other. For the moment, I 
w i l l briefly refer to some examples of the ways i n w h i c h 
reading Spinoza and Vasubandhu together promote new 
interpretations of each. I w i l l refer more to Spinoza as he is 
better k n o w n to most Western readers. 
Spinoza's metaphysics has most often been discussed i n 
terms of metaphysical determinism, w h i c h disallows the 
possibil i ty of free action. Such an interpretation is mis-
taken and is largely due to the influence of Western philos-
ophy of re l ig ion w h i c h emphasizes the i m m u t a b l i l i t y of 
G o d and, accordingly, the predetermined laws of cause 
and effect. I propose an alternative interpretation. 2 Spino-
za's Ethics is p r i m a r i l y a phi losophy of becoming, rather 
than a phi losophy of being. It is about becoming ful ly 
h u m a n through apprehension of the ontology of con-
nectedness i n the dynamic process of emergence. T h i s 
interpretation of Spinoza's Ethics is facilitated by compar-
ison of shared topics discussed i n Vasubandhu's Trims ika 
—namely, metaphysics, epistemology, motivat ion, the 
self, and freedom. Vasubandhu's doctrine of pratityasa-
mutpada (interdependent origination) is a metaphysical 
doctrine of nondual interrelatedness, s imilar to Spinoza's 
account of nature, w h i c h is an eternal process of becoming 
through interaction of historical conditions. Juxtapos ing 
the two phi losophies al lows the possibility of interpreting 
Spinoza's metaphysics independent of the not ion of prede-
terminism and, at the same time, demystifies the Buddhis t 
doctrine of prati tyasamutpada. 
T h e i r metaphysics are closely associated w i t h their 
ethics. Benevolence is the natural basis of ethics, and jus-
tice is the conventional basis w h i c h is required because 
trust needs to be formally stipulated i n the absence of 
natural benevolence. Justice has its place i n the context of 
absence of felt ontological interdependency. O b l i g a t i o n , 
i n the views of Spinoza and Vasubandhu, is tied to love 
through metaphysical interconnectedness. There is no 
dichotomy between mora l obl igat ion and car ing for 
another. Part icular personal encounters are explained 
w i t h i n the context of universal principles of nondual i ty . 
One's obl igat ion is fundamentally to oneself. T h a t obl iga-
t ion is to express the natural drive for the fullest actualiza-
t ion of one's potential . Self-actualization is not, however, 
an expression of egoism; rather, it is an expression of 
receptivity and responsiveness to others. It includes 
awareness of the reciprocal nature of social contexts, 
w h i c h are reflections of ontological interrelatedness. 
Benevolence, i. e., concern for the wel l -being of others, 
is intr insic to self-actualization. In f u l f i l l i n g one's obl iga-
t ion to oneself, one develops an inclusiveness toward oth-
ers, w h i c h is experienced as love for them. Justice is 
required w h e n there is n o basis for receptivity of the other, 
when fairness is required i n the absence of natural benevo-
lence. In an ideal state, justice as a conventional means of 
fair-mindedness is unnecessary; however, because it is 
actually impossible to be intimately connected w i t h and 
care deeply for others beyond a certain l i m i t of relations, 
justice is a necessary conventional practice. C a r i n g and 
justice are continuous w i t h each other, reflecting more or 
less sympathy i n one's experience of relatedness. Both 
car ing and justice f ind their source i n the metaphysics of 
connectedness described by Spinoza and Vasubandhu. 
Just as one theory of metaphysics sheds l ight o n the 
other, Spinoza's and Vasubandhu's epistemologies are 
mutua l ly i l l u m i n a t i n g . Both philosophers assume the 
inclusiveness of reason and emotion i n their theories of 
knowledge. T h e inseparability of reason and emot ion is 
intr insic to their views of the ontological connectedness of 
m i n d and body. Accordingly , ethics is simultaneously a 
matter of affective and cognitive awareness. Part icular 
experiences of car ing are explained by reference to onto-
logica l connectedness. One's epistemological stance pro-
vides a context for one's immediate experience. 3 T h e anal-
ysis of Spinoza's epistemology i n l ight of Vasubandhu's 
s imi lar emphasis on the inclusiveness of cogni t ion and 
emot ion leads to the conclus ion that Spinoza's theory of 
knowledge cannot be appropriately described as rational-
ist i n the strict sense. Ideas are invariably emotively toned. 
T h e y are ideas of sensations of the body. There is no 
possibi l i ty for the existence of true disembodied ideas 
w h i c h are free of bodi ly sensation. Emot ions are the 
expressions of the coexistence of ideas and sensations. 
T h e i r theories of motivat ion include the foundational 
assumption that action is motivated by emotively toned 
interest. T h e self, for both philosophers, is a force w h i c h is 
oriented toward actualization through positive interac-
t ion w i t h environmental components, i n c l u d i n g other 
selves as wel l as ecological conditions. Personal autonomy 
requires freedom of expression of the life force of other 
persons and things. Spinoza and Vasubandhu both con-
tribute their o w n particular insights to the discussion of 
these topics, one f rom the Western rationalist tradition 
and the other f rom the Indian yogacara tradition. T h e 
interaction of their insights provides a un ique and valua-
ble holistic perspective on the study of h u m a n nature and 
self-determination. 
Spinoza's and Vasubandhu's mutua l ly i n f o r m i n g the-
ories of ethics are valuable resources for feminist moral 
phi losophy and theories of moral agency. 4 A n important 
contr ibut ion of both Spinoza and Vasubandhu is the 
g r o u n d i n g of ethics i n a holistic metaphysics w h i c h 
assumes the inseparability of thought and sensation, 
manifested invar iably as emotively toned consciousness. 
Vir tue , i. e., the expression of one's potential, is explained 
by references to desire. In neither of the views is the 
rat ional w i l l seen as the mot ivat ing factor of behavior; and 
yet both are p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h ethical conduct. For 
both Spinoza and Vasubandhu, desire is tied to under-
standing. Whether an i n d i v i d u a l is active or passive 
depends u p o n both emotion and intellect. There is no 
possibil i ty i n either of the views for virtue to be defined 
wi thout reference to emotion. Development of personal 
authority, i. e. , one's true nature, is seen to require an 
inclusive relation between reason and emotion. Personal 
authority derives f rom exist ing i n a relat ional way, based 
o n experiencing the ontology of connectedness. T h e 
n o t i o n of hierarchical power does not apply to these views 
of reality. A l l intent ion and action is explained by refer-
ence to the desire for expression of one's basic nature. 
One's basic nature is explained i n terms of the inextricable 
relation between ideas and emotions. Indeed, ideas and 
emotions are understood as two different ways of describ-
i n g a single phenomenon. T h e phenomenon is always 
understood as a felt experience responded to according to 
one's understanding of causal interrelatedness. As one 
apprehends the reality of interdependent causality one 
responds caringly, without excessive attachment or repul-
s ion. In that way, one is conscious of the essential depend-
ence on al l others—one's o w n power is empowerment 
through others. 
Spinoza5 
H u m a n nature, in Spinoza's view, is defined i n terms of 
conatus: the appetite which motivates one to action. It is 
the natural tendency to develop one's activities toward 
one's o w n happiness. In so far as one is do ing that, one is 
active; otherwise, one is passive. A c t i o n is associated w i t h 
adequate causation and passion w i t h inadequate causa-
tive qualities. T h e relation between inadequate ideas and 
passions is described as follows: "the more the m i n d has 
inadequate ideas, the more it is subject to passive states 
(passionibus)... " (Corollary, Proposi t ion 1, III). Spinoza, 
however, does not equate emotions w i t h passions or pas-
sivity. Emot ions tie the sensible impressions of the body to 
the ideas of the m i n d and are actions if they are associated 
w i t h adequate ideas. H e posits, 
By emotions (affectus) I understand the affections of 
the body by w h i c h the body's power of activity is 
increased or diminished, assisted or checked, together 
w i t h the ideas of these affections. 
T h u s , if we can be the adequate cause of one of 
these affections, then by emotion I understand activ-
ity, otherwise passivity (Definit ion 3, III). 
H i s "mode-identity thesis" 6 states that "a mode of 
Extension [an object] and the idea of that mode are one 
and the same thing, expressed i n two ways" (Schol ium, Pr. 
7, II). It is an argument for an identity relation between 
sensible impressions and their corresponding ideas. T h a t 
thesis is supported by his "substance-identity thesis," 
w h i c h claims that " t h i n k i n g substance and extended sub-
stance are one and the same substance, comprehended 
now under this attribute, now under that." 7 In Spinoza's 
substance-identity thesis, everything is understood to be a 
form of activity. T h o u g h t and extension are experienced 
as different modes of activity. Spinoza understands sub-
stance to be dynamic matter w h i c h involves patterns of 
qualitative variety rather than fixed forms. T h e impor-
tance of Spinoza's theory of substance here is the use he 
ultimately makes of it for his theory of ethical develop-
ment. 
Ethica l development, for Spinoza, involves intuit ive 
awareness of the pantheistic nature of reality, the dynamic 
interrelatedness of what exists. T h e self is apprehended as 
a locus of interacting conditions, w i t h a unique perspec-
tive on the essentially nondualist ic process of emergence. 
One actively participates i n the whole process when one 
experiences the basic nature of the continually changing 
patterns of ways of exist ing, of w h i c h one is an essential 
aspect and through w h i c h one is actualized. 
Reason is neither the sole nor the primary motivat ion 
for act ion. " W e do not endeavor, w i l l , seek after or desire a 
t h i n g because we judge it to be good, on the contrary, we 
judge it to be good because we endeavor, w i l l seek after or 
desire i t " (Schol ium, Pr . 7, II). Mot ivat ion for action, i n 
Spinoza's view, is explained by reference to active or pas-
sive emotion rather than to reason or emotion. E m o t i o n 
involves both cognit ion and sensation. H e writes, 
experience tells us no less clearly than reason that . . . 
mental decisions are noth ing more than the appe-
tites themselves, varying therefore according to the 
varying disposi t ion of the body. For each man's 
actions are shaped by his e m o t i o n . . . (Schol ium, Pr . 
2, III). 
For Spinoza, cogni t ion is invariably toned according to 
one's emotions. One is always motivated to act according 
to one's emotional bias. As one's emotions become 
informed, however, they change i n k i n d — f r o m unhe lpfu l 
to h e l p f u l so that one's conduct becomes more appro-
priate. A l l affections are the reult of three basic emotions: 
pleasure (laetitia), p a i n (tristitia), and desire (cupiditas). 
Pleasure is "the passive transition of the m i n d to a state of 
greater perfection" and p a i n is "the passive transition of 
the m i n d to a state of less perfection" (Schol ium, Pr . 11, 
III). Desire is "appetite accompanied by the consciousness 
thereof" (Schol ium, Pr . 9). 
Appetite (appetitus) is defined as a person's essence, the 
life force (conatus), w h i c h is related to both the m i n d and 
the body and is the end of a l l our actions (Schol ium, Pr . 
110 and D e f i n i t i o n 7, IV) . It is the endeavor to persist 
according to one's o w n nature. Ac t ion is the exercise of 
one's appetite. T h e primary emotions constitute the basic 
motivat ing force of action. 
T h e w i l l (voluntas) is ineffective i n the face of affec-
tions. Because it is understood as the aspect of the conatus 
that is related to the m i n d a lone—in contrast to appetite 
w h i c h is the conatus related to both m i n d and body (Scho-
l i u m , Pr . 9, III), the w i l l is powerless to control emotions, 
w h i c h involve both affections and ideas. In view of Spino-
za's identity-thesis it is impossible that the w i l l could exist 
or funct ion apart from the appetite. 
Just as there is no ontological dist inct ion between rea-
son and emotion i n Spinoza's view, there is no actual 
separation of m i n d and body. Accordingly , the associa-
tions of passive matter w i t h w o m e n and of active form 
w i t h men that are found i n Aristotle's metaphysics 8 have 
no place i n Spinoza's thought. T h i s is not to say that 
Spinoza's views disal low the possibility of gender-specific 
impl icat ions . M y account here merely points out that 
there is greater l i k e l i h o o d of proceeding a l o n g egalitarian 
lines, us ing the more hol is t ic approach of Spinoza rather 
than the dichotomized approach of Aristotle. 
Spinoza's egalitarian ethics are a consequence of his 
metaphysics. H i s pantheistic understanding of G o d as 
nature is spelled out as a cont inuously creative situation 
w i t h neither a beginning nor an end. G o d (nature) is an 
eternal process of development. Each i n d i v i d u a l is a mode 
of that process. Virtue comes to be equated w i t h the power 
of expression of one's essence, i. e. , one's conatus; such 
expression is possible only i n conditions of cooperation. 
One's power is expressed only i n positive conditions. 
P a i n , or lack of power, results from oppressive conditions. 
E t h i c a l development involves discovering one's essential 
nature. T h a t discovery requires understanding the interre-
latedness of the natural order, first according to universal 
principles and then by in tu i t ion . That understanding 
natural ly involves agreeable and useful conduct i n the 
societal context, o w i n g to the causal relatedness of things 
and events. 
Self-satisfaction consists i n correlating one's desires 
w i t h the interests of others. It means having an under-
standing of the interrelatedness of contextual conditions 
and deriving pleasure f rom that understanding, w h i c h is a 
form of self-expression. Pleasure is tied to self-expression. 
T r u e and adequate ideas of the causal order are required 
for pleasure. Vir tue lies i n replacing confused ideas about 
the nature of things w i t h adequate ideas, thereby trans-
f o r m i n g passive emotions into active emotions. Active 
emotions are constitutive of true and adequate ideas, 
w h i c h constitute power or self-expression, i. e. , virtue. 
Virtue involves the realization of one's essential related-
ness i n the natural order. 
In Spinoza's view, it is impossible that one can pursue 
one's o w n good at the expense of the good of others. 
Pursui t of one's o w n good fol lows from a desire for plea-
sure. Pleasure comes f rom increased knowledge. Increased 
knowledge leads to love for others because of understand-
i n g causal relations. L o v e for others, through understand-
i n g the relational nature of existing conditions, leads 
ultimately to love of God—the total relational scene. C o n -
versely, the love of G o d (the intuit ive grasp of the total 
context) assists i n further love of other h u m a n beings. O u r 
basic appetite or desire (conatus), w h i c h is described as our 
essence, leads natural ly to love of others and of G o d . H e 
continues: 
desire, i n so far as it is related to m i n d , is the very 
essence of m i n d (Def. of Emot ions 1). N o w the 
essence of m i n d consists i n knowledge (Pr. I l l , II) 
w h i c h involves the knowledge of G o d (Pr. 47, II), 
wi thout w h i c h (Pr. 15, I) it can neither be nor be 
conceived. So the more the essence of the m i n d 
involves knowledge of G o d , the greater the desire 
w i t h w h i c h he w h o pursues virtue desires for 
another the good w h i c h he seeks for himself (Proof, 
Pr . 37). 
For Spinoza, h a v i n g qualities that are good and useful, 
or per forming acts that are so, are natural consequences of 
understanding causal interrelatedness. Indeed, they are 
co-extensive w i t h it. In this way knowledge is goodness 
and ignorance is evil . Knowledge is equated w i t h action, 
action in turn is equated w i t h power. Power is understood 
i n terms of relatedness rather than dominat ion . Accord-
ingly , Spinoza's phi losophy of becoming provides a use-
fu l historical source for a feminist, egalitarian theory of 
ethics. 
Vasubandhu9 
Vasubandhu, l ike Spinoza, describes h u m a n nature by 
reference to both reason and emotion. In his account of the 
alayavijnana (pre-reflective basic consciousness), he de-
scribes five constitutive features:(a) rapport (reg pa), (b) 
feeling tone (tshor ba), (c) a part icular mental orientation 
(semspa), (d) focus of attention (yid la byedpa), and (e) the 
capacity to understand i n a conceptual way ('du shes). 10 
Rapport refers to the relatedness of subject and object of 
consciousness. F r o m this po int of view, one exists neces-
sarily i n a relational mode. There are three aspects to 
rapport: sense organs (dbang po), external objects (yul), 
and the perceptual-cognitive operations (mam par shes 
pa, Trims ika , p. 15). W h e n these three aspects exist i n a 
satisfactory relation, one's feeling-tone (disposition) is 
positive. 
Feeling-tone is experienced as pleasant (bde ba), unplea-
sant (sdug bsngal), and neither pleasant nor unpleasant 
(sdug bsngal ba yang ma yin bde ba yang ma yin pa, p . 17). 
One's experiences of attachment, repuls ion or equanimity 
are characterized by an emotive tone. T h e neutrality of 
equanimity does not mean apathy, rather it indicates a 
lack of prejudice toward the conditions w h i c h exist. A 
neutral feeling tone is thought to reflect the experience 
(myong ba) of reality, wi thout evaluative bias, as a f low of 
consciousness of interacting conditions. 
T h e third basic mental phenonema (sems pa) is the 
inherent tendency i n one to incl ine attention i n one 
direction or another i n reference to the input one 
experiences. T h e motivation of the intellect (yid) 
moves the m i n d toward an objective referent i n the 
manner i n w h i c h an i ron moves by the power of a 
magnet (p. 18)." 
T h i s qual i ty of consciousness eliminates the possibil i ty of 
indifference to inc l ina t ion . We are naturally inc l ined 
toward various referents and must respond to them. 
T h e capacity to focus one's attention, given a particular 
attraction, constitutes the fourth basic qual i ty of con-
sciousness (yid la byed pa). Attent ion is p a i d to certain 
objects of reference because of the attraction they have for 
the perceiver. T h i s qual i ty of consciousness has the func-
t ion of m a k i n g one's m i n d return repeatedly to a referent 
so that it becomes more dominant i n the f low of one's 
consciousness. In the state of consciousness described as 
basic awareness (alayavijnana), an object of attention 
becomes integrated into the f low of consciousness i n a 
neutral way, causing no attachment or repulsion. At -
tachment or repuls ion occurs when one's f low of con-
sciousness is interrupted so that particular objects of atten-
t ion are given special notice. T h a t is described as the m i n d 
"s t i ck ing or hanging on to" ('dzin pa) an object (p. 16). 
Due to the fifth basic characteristic of consciousness ('du 
shes), we experience static images of dynamic reality. We 
mistakenly come to think that the images (dmigs) reflect 
reality. T h e conceptualized w o r l d becomes the only w o r l d 
we know. W h e n this quali ty dominates consciousness one 
has what is usually referred to as an intellectual under-
standing. A n intellectual understanding reflects a dis-
torted view of dynamic patterns of interaction. It is w i t h -
out the felt, holist ic experience of the intercausality of 
existing conditions. Intellectual knowledge is tied to ego-
centricity and its concomitant factor: arrogance. T h e 
rational understanding of universal principles does not 
constitute true knowledge. One has to go beyond that 
form of knowledge and experience the process of interre-
latedness i n an "exis tent ia l " way, i. e., as a way of being in 
an interdependent relational pattern of existence. Rat ional 
understanding of universal principles comprises a required 
step on the ladder toward knowledge of the nonduali ty of 
interacting patterns. It is, however, only a transitory phase 
and must be passed through if one is to gain freedom from 
negative emotive tone, i.e., misery, w h i c h is a necessary 
qual i ty of a dichotomized consciousness. 
T h e process of achieving wisdom involves overcoming 
two basic hindrances: attachment to the self as a separate 
reality (ngar sems), and a n intellectual understanding of 
reality (yul la mam par rig pa). As a result of egocentricity 
and intellectual arrogance, we experience the wor ld 
aggressively rather than cooperatively. Egocentricity and 
intellectual distortion are the sources of negative emo-
tions. Negative emotions arise from frustrated expecta-
tions_due to a lack of awareness of interrelated causality 
(pratityasamutpada). Vasubandhu claims that enlight-
enment consists of the development of mental qualities 
w h i c h have a positive emotive tone—such as trust, self-
respect, and nonviolence—but w h i c h do not lead to at-
tachment. Posi t ive mental qual i t ies develop as one 
increasingly experiences oneself i n a relational way. Such 
experience depends on development of focused attention, 
through meditation and study of the sacred teachings of 
the Buddha. Vasubandhu emphasizes rigorous mental 
development, whi le at the same time cautions that mental 
development is problematic without feeling the expe-
rience of interdependence w i t h others. Cul t iva t ion of the 
m i n d comes to be synonymous w i t h cult ivation of positive 
emotive quali t ies . 1 2 
Spir i tua l enlightenment is considered to be coextensive 
w i t h ethical conduct; a l l disruptive mental qualities must 
be e l iminated i n the process of spir i tual growth. Such 
disruptive influences are: passionate attachment ('dod 
chags), anger (khong khro), arrogance (nga rgyal), lack of 
insight (ma rig pa), opinionatedness (Ita ba), and lack of 
commitment (the tshoms)(p. 39). 1 3 Passionate attachment 
to the self forms the basis for a l l the other negative mental 
phenomena. Such attachment is inappropriate because it 
is based on the mistaken view that the self has a fixed 
nature. One becomes attached to a static image, w h i c h 
makes it impossible to accommodate oneself to the chang-
i n g reality that one is. Attachment to an i l l u s i o n leads to 
inappropriate expectations w h i c h are frustrated. Frustra-
t ion then characterizes such a person's existence. A l l sub-
sequent mental characteristics are bound to be inconsist-
ent w i t h a calm m i n d because anyth ing that is associated 
w i t h frustration leads to further frustration. Accordingly, 
for Vasubandhu, spir i tual enlightenment involves over-
c o m i n g attachment and its consequent negative effects. 
T h e development of compassion and w i s d o m through the 
cul t ivat ion of such qualities as confidence, self-respect, 
nonhatred, diligence and nonviolence is seen to constitute 
self-expression, that is, the expression of one's experience 
of being a part of the eternal process of becoming. Vasu-
bandhu has no sense of unilateral causation. Accordingly, 
there is n o idea of power as d o m i n a t i o n over another. 
Power is given to a person through experiencing the mut-
ual creation of ourselves through relationship. 
H e describes joyfulness as a state of balance that is 
arrived at through intuit ive apprehension of the interde-
pendent relatedness of transitory conditions, i n c l u d i n g 
oneself (pp. 88-89). Ul t imate awareness provides for peace 
of m i n d because there is an understanding of why things 
occur as they do. One understands the network of causality 
w h i c h promotes a situation of wel l -being. Since reality is 
seen w h o l ly as contextual, the sense of self as an independ-
ent entity disappears. Egocentricity and the correspond-
i n g self-centred modes of relating to others are also 
removed. Joy, the ultimate quali ty of existence, reflects 
personal integration, w h i c h is understood as the harmon-
ious interaction of a l l factors i n a given context. L i k e 
Spinoza, Vasubandhu claims that w i s d o m is synonymous 
w i t h joy and confused knowledge is coextensive w i t h a 
troubled existence. 
B o t h Spinoza and Vasubandhu c l a i m that one pursues 
that w h i c h gives one pleasure. Spinoza claims that one 
endeavors to pursue that w h i c h gives one pleasure because 
what gives one pleasure is what promotes one's essential 
self. It is natural to pursue pleasure and avoid p a i n . Vasu-
bandhu claims that one pursues what interests one, and 
what interests one depends on the emotive value attached 
to it. T h e pursuit of pleasure, i n both accounts, is asso-
ciated w i t h ethical conduct. Ethica l conduct is equated 
w i t h freedom, w h i c h is equated w i t h happiness—all are 
accounted for through the integral relation between ideas 
and emotions, without reference to an independent rational 
w i l l . As one's understanding of interdependent causality 
develops so that it is characterized more by universal ism 
and less by part icular ism, one's emotions change i n k i n d 
from disruptive to constructive. Ult imately the not ion of 
universalism is transcended i n the experience of con-
nectedness, w h i c h is the most complete experience of joy. 
For both Spinoza and Vasubandhu, the holistic experien-
t ial state of joy is a higher form of self-expression than the 
exercise of rationality. Ethica l conduct is not a matter of 
duty, it is an expression of one's true nature. 
We can conclude f rom this analysis that it is reasonable 
to (1) define h u m a n nature in terms of emotion as wel l as 
reason and (2) to understand ethical development as a 
transition from an uninformed existence characterized by 
negative emotions to an informed existence characterized 
by positive emotions. Such a developmental view of 
h u m a n nature involves an integration of m i n d and body 
as we l l as of reason and emotion. F i n a l l y , i n Spinoza and 
Vasubandhu one finds an understanding of the power of 
self-expression described consistently i n terms of power 
through relations w i t h others rather than power over oth-
ers. It is this understanding of power that is at the core of 
feminist ethics. 
Noddings 1 4 
N e l N o d d i n g s ' pr imary concern is moral agency rather 
than mora l phi losophy. She argues that caring, act ing o n 
behalf of the other, is fundamental to ethical conduct. 
Such action derives from a natural impulse. A n ethic of 
car ing comes f rom a natural l o n g i n g for goodness "rooted 
i n receptivity, relatedness, and responsiveness" (Caring, p . 
2). N o d d i n g s claims that an ethic of pr inciple , tradit ional 
ethics, begins w i t h moral reasoning and is secondary to an 
ethics of caring, w h i c h stems from the disposit ion toward 
goodness. L o n g i n g for goodness, natural caring, is the 
universal , subjective core w h i c h gives substance to our 
interest i n moral i ty . We have a l l experienced natural car-
i n g and those experiences i m p l i c i t l y guide our behavior as 
mora l beings. She locates the " w e l l s p r i n g of ethical behav-
ior i n h u m a n affective response" (p. 3) rather than i n 
rat ional abstractions. 
Analys i s of mora l judgement is one way of discussing 
the quest ion " W h a t is moral i ty?" . A n alternative—and 
preferable—way, according to Noddings , is i n terms of 
mora l impulse , natural car ing (p. 28). She prefers to dis-
cuss moral i ty i n terms of moral impulse because a l l ethical 
conduct begins w i t h an expression of the ethical ideal, 
w h i c h is defined as "that v i s ion of best self" (p. 80) and is 
developed " i n congruence w i t h one's best remembrance of 
car ing and being cared-for'' (p. 94). We d i m i n i s h ourselves 
wh en we act unethical ly because we are not exercising the 
v i s i o n of our best self, w h i c h stresses our relatedness to 
others. O u r sense of ob l iga t ion , that is, our experience of 
the imperative "I o u g h t " comes from the 
fundamental and natural desire to be and to remain 
related. T o reject the feeling [of obligation] when it 
arises is either to be i n an internal state of imbalance 
or to contribute w i l l f u l l y to the d i m i n u t i o n of the 
ethical ideal (p. 83). 
O b l i g a t i o n is a funct ion of personal interrelatedness 
rather than of the a priori idea of freedom that is the 
metaphysical foundation of obl igat ion for K a n t . 1 5 
N o d d i n g s ties self-expression to obl igat ion (pp. 81-90). 
T h e ethical ideal, i.e., the v i s i o n of the best self, is expe-
rienced through the reciprocity of car ing for another 
a n d being cared for. O u r ob l iga t ion to care is an impulse 
w h i c h is fundamental to our natures as h u m a n beings 
w h o are born into a web of reciprocal relations. T h i s 
network of interdependent relationships means that "rela-
t ion itself is fundamental i n o b l i g a t i o n " (p. 87). Because 
we are h u m a n , we feel obligated toward others who are 
present to us. Response to a feeling of obl igat ion thus 
constitutes a response to o u r fundamental being. Self-
expression is, i n part, expression of our sense of obliga-
t ion. Authentic self-expression is naturally ethical because 
it involves car ing for others through choosing to respond 
to our o w n natural disposit ion to exist i n caring relations. 
W e can choose to express ourselves or we can choose to 
deny self-expression. 
Noddings provides a paradigm of morality w h i c h 
al lows for female-oriented ethics to be normative. She, 
among others, 1 6 c laims that an ethics of caring counter-
balances the male-oriented ethics of pr inciple . Noddings 
claims that the different social realities of the two genders 
dictate two different ethical orientations: " a n ethic of car-
i n g arises, I believe, out of our experience as women, just 
as the traditional logical approach to ethical problems 
arises more obviously from masculine experience" (p. 8). 
Studies such as those conducted by Kohlberg and Kramer 1 7 
have based their theories of moral development o n studies 
of males exclusively, 1 8 us ing the model of rational justif i -
ca t ion , 1 9 and have denigrated female morality because it 
does not correspond to male mora l i ty . 2 0 
Noddings, Spinoza and Vasubandhu 
N o d d i n g s has r ight ly pointed out that we need an alter-
native account of ethics w h i c h w i l l provide a normative 
account of female morality; however, according to her 
c l a i m that humans have a natural impulse to care, N o d -
dings w o u l d be committed to h o l d i n g the view that the 
ethics of car ing is normative for humani ty and not solely 
for women. H e r ethics of car ing assumes, as do the ethics 
of Spinoza and Vasubandhu, a view of h u m a n nature i n 
w h i c h the notion of interrelatedness is central. She states 
this expl ic i t ly i n her c l a i m that " m y very indiv idual i ty is 
defined i n a set of relations. T h i s is my basic real i ty" (p. 
51). T h e view that ethics is tied to a theory of h u m a n 
nature i n w h i c h receptivity, relatedness and responsive-
ness are central is a major point of connection between 
feminist ethics and the ethics of Spinoza and Vasubandhu. 
In addit ion, they a l l c l a i m that emotions are integral to the 
experience of interrelatedness. Consciousness of oneself 
presupposes awareness of one's emotional disposit ion to 
the other. E th ica l conduct is the consequence of receptiv-
ity. Noddings ' relation between self-expression and ethics 
is s imi lar to the relation of these elements i n both Spinoza 
and Vasubandhu. They a l l assert the essential interre-
latedness of persons. O u r i n d i v i d u a l expression depends 
on i n p u t from others, so that we cannot satisfactorily 
express our o w n nature without being received by others. 
Receptivity, relatedness and responsiveness are required to 
sustain personal power. 
N o d d i n g s ' feminist ethics differs significantly, how-
ever, f rom the ethics of Spinoza and Vasubandhu i n that 
she seems to assume the possible disconnectedness of rea-
son and emotion. She does not integrate concrete emotive 
experience into the context of rational understanding. 
There is no adequate, systematic method of relating the 
part icular experience of car ing to the larger perspective of 
h u m a n interdependence. Reason and emotion appear to 
be dichotomized i n Noddings ' ethics of caring just as they 
are i n the ethics of pr inc iple of Kant. Her feminine ethics, 
therefore, mirrors that w h i c h it is reacting against, namely 
masculine ethics, as represented by Kant. Nonetheless, 
Noddings contributes greatly to our understanding of 
ethics by directing attention to the present moment. T h e 
ethical i n d i v i d u a l is pr imar i ly concerned w i t h receiving 
the other i n any particular encounter. T h i s is the essence 
of ethics. T h i s occurs i n the ever-present " n o w . "However , 
such a view of ethics need not repudiate universal pr inc i -
ples of interrelatedness and, indeed, cannot if the pr inciple 
of interrelatedness is appl ied systematically. A n ethics of 
receptivity and relatedness requires a holistic metaphysi-
cal framework for coherence of its o w n principles. We 
need governing ethical principles to understand and guide 
us through our lives of interrelatedness. 
In the ethics of Spinoza and Vasubandhu, emotive expe-
riences are integral to rat ional understanding. There is a 
m u t u a l l y inclusive relation between the emotionally 
laden particular and the rationally conceived general. D i a -
logue between the holist ic approaches of these two phi lo -
sophers f rom the past and current feminist approaches 
provides an opportuni ty to focus on the immediate expe-
rience of car ing whi le , at the same time, showing its 
connect ion w i t h the ontology of connectedness. T h e dia-
log ica l consequence is the connection made between a 
metaphysical account of h u m a n nature and car ing as the 
pr imary attitude. T h e immediate experience of caring is a 
component of h u m a n nature. It provides a systematic 
u n d e r p i n n i n g for ethics. Receptivity to the other is the 
pr imary, irreducible intent ional mode presupposed by 
ethical attitudes. 
Dialogue between feminism, on the one hand, and the 
theories of Spinoza and Vasubandhu, o n the other, devel-
ops a greater consciousness of the integration of imme-
diate experience and general principles of relatedness and 
receptivity. T h e contributions of each approach yield a 
more complete account of the interdependence of the par-
ticular w i t h the universal without sacrifice to either p r i n -
ciple. It is a dynamic process of mutual ly i n f o r m i n g . T h e 
uninterpreted, raw data is given meaning according to the 
consciousness of metaphysical intercausality. Every expe-
rience of car ing is unique and yet it reflects a universal 
i n c l i n a t i o n toward receptivity of the other. Spinoza and 
Vasubandhu emphasize the universality of the nature of 
personal encounter. Feminists emphasize its particularity. 
Each view has an important dimension to offer the other. 
T h e highest form of self-expression i n al l these views is 
joy, intense receptivity. 
Joy is experienced invariably as a particular occurrence. 
W h e n we are conscious, however, that a particular occur-
rence is an example of universal interrelatedness, its s ignif i -
cance for us as individuals is enhanced. Isolation of a 
particular encounter, o n the other hand, reduces its mean-
i n g . Feminist ethics correctly focuses o n personal encoun-
ter. It appears out of focus, however, i n so far as it separates 
the particular f rom the universal. Dia logue between femi-
nist ethics and the ethics of Spinoza and Vasubandhu may 
lead to such a holist ic theory of h u m a n nature i n w h i c h 
obl igat ion and car ing are inseparable manifestations of 
self-expression. Both obligation and caring revolve around 
trust i n oneself as a constructive force i n the web of inter-
connectedness. Such trust entails obl igat ion to oneself. 
O n e is obl iged to care for oneself, to receive oneself. Such 
receptivity and caring is naturally extended to others when 
one experiences oneself as interdependent and empowered 
by others. 
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A Man's Home Is His Castle 
T h e point is 
the top of a spire — 
the sharp end of your elaborate 
castle of the ego! Listen — 
I am tired of the stong religious whiteness 
of your elevated structure, 
of the gutless rituals w i t h i n . 
In fact, I l ike rain d r i p p i n g 
from gutterless corners, 
w i n d reaching its cool fingers 
through two-by-fours, fire bur ing 
o n the floor of my fish house! I l ike 
my luc id , inflated, and unrequited ability 
to be cut by the t h o m i n your steeple. 
O n l y people who geomance, 
dance utterly without technique, 
fish for self-distortions, and 
indulge i n a wealth of blood 
are admitted here. 
" I h u r t " 
is the sign on my door. 
Quite unl ike 
" I 'm a m a n " 
o n your's. 
Nancy Wallace 
Maine 
